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Abstract— This paper seeks to establish whether 
public agro-food interventions like food quality labels 
contribute or not to the promotion of rural employment. 
To this end, the paper uses original longitudinal firm 
and plant level datasets on the French cheese industry to 
assess the impact of the Protected Designation of Origin 
(PDO) label on rural employment. The data is used to 
test the impact of the PDO label on equilibrium market 
structure in the downstream cheese processing segment, 
and to establish backward linkages this segment has on 
upstream plant-level employment and the number of 
dairy farmers. Our results show that the PDO label has 
increased the equilibrium number of firms at the 
national level, because the introduction of this label has 
created market segmentation which reduced barriers to 
entry. In turn, this higher number of cheese firms 
resulted in more employment in dairy farms and 
processing plants at the district level. However, the PDO 
label exerts pressure on farmers to abide by strict 
production techniques, which may cause exit due to cost 
increases. Yet our estimates show that the employment 
benefits of this label outweigh the potential losses it 
might create due to its product specification stringency. 
Keywords— Market Structure, Protected Designation 
of Origin, Rural Employment 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) developed by 
the European Commission emphasized the role of food 
quality policy as a tool for product diversification and 
rural development. It has created different food quality 
labels, while reducing its direct price support 
instruments. These quality labels aimed at protecting 
the designations of agricultural and food products 
whose quality comes from their geographical origin. 
The main two labels are the Protected Designation of 
Origin (PDO) and the Protected Geographical 
Indication (PGI) (European regulation 2081/92 
followed by regulation 510/2006). Their main 
objectives are the development of rural activity to 
increase farmers' income; achieving a balance between 
supply and demand; developing less favored areas, 
and sustaining rural employment. 
The literature on public quality labels has shown that 
they can be an efficient tool for producers to signal the 
quality of their products. When engaging in a PDO 
value chain, producers incur additional costs linked to 
the quality requirements (Bouamra-Mechemache and 
Chaaban, 2010a), but they benefit from a higher 
quality reputation and thus higher margins. Yet the 
profitability of the PDO label for producers ultimately 
depends on the market structure and the possibility of 
output control, as shown by Marette and Crespi 
(2003), Lence et al. (2007), and Hayes et al. (2004). 
This possibility of market control behavior arises even 
if the development of a welfare enhancing PDO label  
may occur in a perfect competition market as shown 
by Moschini et al. (2008), in the case where free entry 
is possible on the market.  
While the literature on the effectiveness of the PDO 
label in raising agro-firms’ income is abundant (c.f. 
review in Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban, 
2010b); to our knowledge the literature which 
evaluates the impact of food quality labels on the rural 
economy at large is almost nonexistent.  In fact, while 
the PDO policy applies to the final food product, the 
whole production chain (farmers and processors) is 
involved in its production. The competition and 
market structure downstream which affect the 
profitability of PDO firms will in turn impact the 
profitability of farmers upstream, in addition to the 
labeling and quality costs. This paper aims at 
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addressing this issue, and contributes to the empirical 
evaluation of the PDO regulation as a tool for rural 
development. 
It is devoted to the analysis of the ability of quality 
label to sustain the existence of agrofood chain by 
taking into account its incidence both on downstream 
firms and upstream farmers. It does not deal with the 
impact of PDO in the development of tourism in rural 
areas but rather focus on employment as a measure of 
rural activity and more particularly we analyze the 
contribution of PDO policy to develop employment in 
the agricultural and food sector and in particular in 
less favored areas. 
The empirical analysis applies to the impact of the 
label "Appelation d'Origine Controlée" (AOC) on 
regional employment in the French cheese sector. The 
AOC label is older than its European equivalent PDO. 
France was one of the first country (with Italy) to 
introduce this kind of label. It applied first to wine in 
1935 followed by the cheese sector. All French 
cheeses produced under AOC labels also benefits from 
the European PDO one. The French cheese sector is 
thus relevant to analyze the impact of PDO labels. It 
enables us to determine the regional effect of the AOC 
policy on the number of milk producers and on the 
number of dairy processors. 
The empirical assessment of the AOC label requires 
data on the characteristics of both producers and 
products. Two databases at hand on the French dairy 
sectors provide this information. The first one (the 
Annual Firm Survey from SCESS) provides 
information on firms' characteristics while the second 
one (the Annual Dairy Survey) provides detailed data 
on production at the plant level and makes it possible 
in particular to distinguish PDO from non PDO 
production. In addition to this database, we use 
aggregate data to get information on the evolution of 
milk producers. We are then able to get information at 
the department level on a 10 year period (1996-2006). 
Our empirical analysis is based on the works of Sutton 
(1991) and Symeonidis (2002). We test the following 
empirical assumption by comparing PDO areas (at 
department level) to non PDO ones: the PDO label, by 
generating product differentiation relaxes the 
competition between PDO and non PDO firms. This 
would lead to have more firms on the market at the 
equilibrium. This higher number of cheese processors 
on the market could sustain the employment as well as 
the demand for milk. 
An increase in the demand for PDO milk in a given 
area would lead to sustain the number of milk 
producers in this area. Our result shows that PDO 
label does have a positive effect on the number of milk 
farmers: a 10% increase in the share of PDO 
production in a given department would lead to a 8% 
increase in the number of cheese plants and to a 6% 
increase in the number of milk producers. 
 
II.  INDUSTRY STRCTURE AND MARKET 
SIZE  
The majority of PDO registered products in the EU 
is composed of processed rather than raw food 
commodities, like cheese, wine, butter, and processed 
meat. For this, the development of a PDO label 
requires the participation of both upstream farmers and 
downstream processors. From a policy perspective, the 
impact of the PDO regulation on rural development 
will thus depend on the vertical relations between 
upstream producers and downstream processing firms. 
As a result, the outcome of the regulation will not only 
depend on the upstream market structure but also on 
the competitive structure of the downstream market. 
The structure of the downstream market will thus 
influence both the downstream and the upstream 
market. This will in turn determine the level of 
employment both in the downstream industry and in 
the input procurement market. Next we present one of 
the main theories that explains the determinants of 
market structure, and which applies quite well to food 
industries. 
A. Downstream market structure  
The determinant of market structure in a given 
industry can be sketched using the theory developed 
by Sutton (1991) and (1998) to analyze the effect of 
market size on the number of firms (the ‘bounds 
approach’). This theory relies on game-theoretical 
models of strategic entry that can provide empirically 
testable and robust predictions concerning the 
determinants of market structure. These predictions 
depend on the type of industry. The first type 
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corresponds to industries where firms produce 
homogenous or horizontally differentiated products 
with exogenous sunk cost. The second type refers to 
endogenous sunk cost industries. When sunk costs are 
exogenous, that is in industries which are 
characterized by low investments in R&D and 
advertising, Sutton shows that the number of firms in a 
free entry market is an increasing function of the size 
of the market relative to the sunk cost firms have to 
pay to enter the industry. The larger the market, the 
higher the number of firms and the higher the sunk 
costs, the lower the number of firms. The function 
specifying the lower bound to equilibrium 
concentration converges monotonically to zero as 
market size increase. For the second type of industries 
that are rather characterized by endogenous sunk costs 
- that is high level of R&D and advertising investment 
- Sutton ‘s theory predicts, that even as the market 
grows without bounds, there is a strictly positive upper 
bound on the equilibrium number of firms. 
Sutton’s prediction for the two types of industry is 
illustrated in figure 1. In exogenous sunk cost markets, 
concentration declines towards zero, because, as 
market size increases, entrants find it profitable to 
build plants of efficient scale and enter the market. In 
contrast, in endogenous sunk cost markets, as market 
size increases, firms have to spend more on 
advertising and/or R&D to maintain their market 
share, which leads to an escalation of (endogenous) 
spending that entrants are not able to handle. In figure 
1, entry is not possible in this type of markets beyond 
point A, and concentration remains bounded away 
from zero.  
 
Figure 1: Market size and concentration lower 
bounds  
 
Empirical studies find evidence of Sutton’s above-
mentioned predictions (Sutton (1991, Ch. 4, 5), 
Robinson and Chiang (1996), Lyons et al. (2001), 
Rogers (2001) and Giorgetti (2003). The market 
structure will be determined by market size, the level 
of production economies of scale, entry conditions and 
price competition. Below we detail some of the main 
predictions that we will test in this present paper. 
Concentration 
Market Size  A 
Concentration lower bound, exogenous sunk costs markets 
 
Concentration lower bound, endogenous sunk costs markets 
 
Market size 
The impact of market size (S) is straightforward from 
Sutton’s theory. When market size increases, the 
number of firms in the industry will increase.  
 
P1: The number of firms on the downstream market 
increases with market size (S). 
 
Economies of scale and entry condition 
The effective market size depends on the industry’s 
minimum efficiency scale (MES). The higher the 
MES, the lower the number of firms in the industry 
(Sutton, 1991). It turns out that the number of 
downstream firms increases with the effective market 
size (S/MES). 
The MES is also a proxy for technological barriers to 
entry. If it is high, then large sunk costs have to be 
incurred by a new firm that wants to enter the market, 
which ultimately makes its entry less likely. High 
MES may deter entry and tends to reduce the number 
of firms in the industry. 
 
P2: The number of firms on the downstream market 
decreases with the level of the minimum efficient scale 
(S). 
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Price competition 
For exogenous sunk cost industries, Sutton (1991) has 
shown  that any exogenous action that has a positive 
impact on prices will reduce the toughness of price 
competition and results in a larger number of firms. 
Namely, if price competition is softened due to the 
public PDO regulation, then introducing PDO labels 
should decrease concentration.  
However, the effect of price competition in 
endogenous sunk cost industries depends on the 
relationship between endogenous sunk costs and price 
competition (Symeonidis [1997a, 1997b]). If price 
competition becomes more intense and 
advertising/R&D expenditure increase (or remain 
constant), then the number of firms will decrease. 
However, if advertising/R&D decreases, the number 
of firms may increase or decrease depending if the 
former decrease is sufficient to compensate for the 
decrease in prices. With PDO regulation, the resulting 
relaxation of competition may be followed by a 
reduction in advertising/R&D competition, which 
makes entry more profitable. But it may also be the 
case that the PDO regulation may result in more 
advertising/R&D expenditures from non PDO firms or 
for PDO firms that want to differentiate their products 
from other PDO labeled products. In this case, entry 
becomes less profitable and the number of firms on the 
market will not increase.  
 
P3: If advertising/R&D do not increase or do not 
increase by too much, we can predict that the PDO 
regulation will relax competition, thus increasing the 
number of firms in the industry. 
B. Vertical linkages 
The total number of farmers and plants will increase 
with the downstream market size, which in turn will 
depend on the sales to the downstream industry. The 
number of plants and farmers is directly linked to the 
number of firms in the market given the vertical 
structure of a given industry (figure 2).  
 
















P4: The total numbers of farmers and plants are 
increasing with the number of firms. 
 
The agricultural market can be seen as a competitive 
exogenous sunk cost industry with a large number of 
farmers. First, the number of farmers in a given area 
will depend on the competitivity of farmers in this 
area. The relative competitivity of an area will depend 
on several factors. Among them, climate and 
geography will influence similarly all farmers in a 
given area and will also impact the productivity of 
farmers (production yields and farm size). Therefore 
the number of farmers has to be lower if the agro-food 
industry is located in an unfavoured area. 
 
P5: The number of farmers is negatively linked with 
less favoured areas. 
 
In addition, PDO production has a specific feature as 
both the input and the output productions have to be 
localized in the PDO region (cf. figure 2). It turns out 
that the downstream market features will impact 
differently the production areas, given the 
competitiveness of farms/plants in these areas as well 
as the possibility or not to produce PDO. 
 
P6: The numbers of farmers in a given area are 
related to the PDO characteristics of this area. 
 
Moreover, the procurement of raw inputs by a plant 
localized in a given area will depend on the nature of 
the transaction costs. If the transaction costs increases 
with distance, then plants have to be implemented in 
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or near the procurement area. For instance, if inputs 
are perishable or if the transport costs of the input are 
high, then plants will be located in the neighbourhood 
of input production units. 
 
P7: The numbers of farmers in a given area is 
increasing with the number of plants localised in the 
same area. 
 
In the following section, we test the above predictions 
for the case of the cheese industry in France. In this 
industry, the milk produced upstream in the different 
geographical areas is processed by different plants. 
Because milk is a perishable product, plants have to be 
located in the same areas or in neighbouring ones. 
National firms may have several plants localised in the 
different areas, but they compete on the national 
market. The PDO label may influence milk production 
activity when adopted, as cheese companies have the 
option to produce either non PDO labelled products, or 
only PDO ones, or both. Their production decisions 
and the resulting downstream structure will influence 
the outcome on the activity in PDO producing areas. 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL  
A. Data  
We use firm and plant surveys covering the period 
1996-2006 provided by the French Administrative 
Direction of Statistics (INSEE). The first main dataset 
reports economic and administrative information at the 
firm level (EAE, Enquête Annuelle d'Entreprise) while 
the second set reports production activities and more 
detailed information on the industrial process at the 
plant level for dairy firms (EAL, Enquete Annuelle 
Laitièere), also provided by INSEE (Institut National 
de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). The 
EAE dataset is available only for firms with more than 
20 employees, while the EAL set is exhaustive at the 
national French level.  The proportion of AOC 
products in the total production of cheese amounts to 
around 17% over the period. We focus in this study on 
AOC cheese made from cow (30 AOC products) and 
sheep milk (3 AOC), which represent 97% of milk 
used in the processing of AOC cheese.  
Each cheese processing firm is identified by an 
identifier at the country level (SIREN) and can thus be 
followed over the entire period using. 
From EAL, we identify all plants using an identifier at 
the plant level (SIRET). This identification number is 
directly linked to firms’ identifier, as the SIRET 
number is composed of the SIREN number of the firm 
plus two additional digits that uniquely identify each 
plant within the firm. We can therefore easily link 
each firm to its plants. Second, the EAL information at 
the plant unit makes possible to have precise 
information on the production of different types of 
cheeses. We have defined six categories of cheese 
products: hard cheese, semi hard cheese, soft cheese, 
blue cheese, processed cheese and other cheese. For 
each category, we observe the overall production as 
well as the proportion of PDO production.
1  
Around 90 firms are operational at the national level 
for each cheese category. From EAE, detailed 
information on the quantity of milk collected is 
available. For each plant, we recover the quantity 
collected as well as the number of farmers by milk 
production area (at the district level). 
From this data, we compute our main dependent 
variables, which are also interrelated. At the country 
level, the number of firms per cheese category is 
denoted by NFIRMSt,s with t is the subscript for year 
and s the cheese sector category. At the district level 
(d), the number of plants, plant workers and farmers is 
respectively denoted by NPLANTSd,t , NEMPd,t and 
NFARMERSd,t. Summary statistics for these variables 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the main 
determinants of downstream market structure (i.e. the 
number of firms) are the market size, the advertising 
to sale ratio as well as the minimum efficient sale. 
These exogenous variables are computed for each 
observed year at the cheese sector level. The 
downstream market size (MSIZEi,t) is measured as the 
sum of cheese firms’ turnover. The advertising to sale 
ratio (ADVi,t) can be directly computed as overall 
advertising expenditures per sector divided by the 
                                                           
1. PDO can be directly observed for most of PDO cheese. For 
other PDO cheese, we recovered information at the plant level 
using other source of information. It was not possible to recover 
the information for goat cheese. 
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sector’s turnover. As shown it table 1, the French 
cheese industry could be classified as an endogenous 
sunk cost industry with a mean advertising-to-sales 
ratio equal to 6.2%. The Minimum efficient scale per 
cheese category (MESi,t) is computed as the output of 
the median plant multiplied by the sector’s assets. In 
addition, to evaluate the impact of the PDO regulation, 
a variable measuring the share of production under 
PDO label for each cheese category has been 
computed (S1_PDO).  
Moreover, we use dummy variables to control for the 
district  k effect (REGk). In order to incorporate 
upstream milk production characteristics, we use a 
variable measuring the share of PDO production in the 
district (S2_PDOk) and dummies that identify districts 
localised in mountain areas (MOUNT) as well as in 
underprivileged areas (UNDER). We also incorporate 
in our analysis the effect of milk production 
externalities on the number of farmers in a given 
district, by computing the share of milk collected by 
plants which originates from the same district, as ratio 
of plants’ overall collected milk input (S_MILK). If in 
a given district most plants collect milk from farmers 
located in the same district, then this will have an 
effect on the optimal number of farmers in this 
particular district in the long run. 
 




Dev. Min  Max 
NFIRMS  4.50 0.52 2.71 5.61 
NPLANTS  2.72 1.04 0.00 5.59 
NEMP  4.81 1.55 0.00 7.88 
NFARMERS  6.76 1.16 2.71 9.08 
MSIZE  19.48 0.69 17.29  20.28 
MES  5.89 0.98 4.61 8.17 
ADV  6.15 4.78 0.05  26.01 
S1_PDO  0.09 0.06 0.00 0.37 
S_MILK  0.40 0.32 0.00 1.00 
S2_PDO  0.15 0.25 0.00 1.00 
MOUNT  0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
UNDER  0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
MOUNTxS2_PDO  0.05 0.15 0.00 0.72 
UNDERxS2_PDO  0.03 0.12 0.00 0.72 
 
B. Empirical model 
We use a three-stage least square estimation system to 
simultaneously evaluate the determinants of the 
number of firms at the national level, as well as the 
number of plants, the number of cheese-processing 
units’ employees, and the number of dairy farmers at 
the district level.  
 
Equation (1) corresponds to the first market stage 
where the number of firms in a given cheese sector is 
estimated as a function of the sector’s market size, the 
minimum efficient scale, the level of advertising and 
the share of PDO for the sector as well as an error 
term i,t. 
 
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 1 i,t i,t ln NFIRMS = + ln MSIZE + ln MES + ADV +  S _PDO +     
 (1) 
Equation (2) establishes the direct link between the 
number of cheese processing plants and the 
corresponding number of firms at the district level.  
 
d,t 0 1 d,t k k ,
k
ln NPLANTS = + ln NFIRMS + REG dt      (2) 
where NFIRMSd,t is the equivalent number of firms 
active in district d at time t.  The equation also 
controls for regional dummies through the REG 
dummies. 
 
Equation (3) provides the direct linkage between the 
number of plants and the number of plant employees 
at the district level. 
 
d,t 0 1 d,t d,t ln NEMP = + ln NPLANTS +      (3) 
 
Equation (4) establishes the determinants of the 
number of dairy farmers in a given district. This 
depends on the number of plants operational in the 
district, the share of milk from the district collected by 
these plants, in addition to district-specific dummy 
variables: 
 
d,t 0 1 d,t 2 d,t 3 2 d,t
45 6 2
72 d , t d , t
ln NFARMERS = + ln NPLANTS + ln S_MILK +   S _PDO
+ MOUNT+  UNDER+    MOUNT*S _PDO
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We estimate two systems of equations by applying 
Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
technique. We first jointly estimate (1), (2) and (3) to 
analyse the determinants of industry employment per 
district. We then focus on the number of farmers by 
estimating the system of equations (1), (2) and (4). 





IV. RESULTS  
Table 2 details our first set of regression estimates. 
Our sector-level regression confirms our first and 
second predictions above (P1 and P2):  The number of 
cheese processing firms on the downstream market 
increases with market size (S) and decreases with the 
level of the minimum efficiency efficient scale (S), as 
both parameters for MSIZE and MES are highly 
significant with the expected signs. Interestingly, our 
third prediction (P3) is also validated by our 
estimation results, as the number of firms seems to 
decrease with sector’s advertising intensity, and to 
increase with the share of PDO production in the 
sector. A high PDO production in a given cheese 
sector seems to promote the number of firms 
operational on the market.  
 
 
Table 2: Three-stage Least Squares estimation 
results, determinants of district-level employment in 
dairy processing plants 
 
  NFIRMS NPLANTS  NEMP 
  coef coef  coef 
MSIZE  0.384***   
MES  -0.234***   
ADV  -0.024***   
S1_PDO  3.237***   
NFIRMS   0.405***   
reg (dummies)    (omitted)   
NPLANTS     0.892*** 
_cons -1.678**    2.407*** 
R-sq 0.44  0.91  0.29 
Nb. Obs. 337 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As for the other regressions, the number of firms 
coefficient has a positive and significant effect on the 
number of plants, and the number of plants in turn 
have a positive and significant effect on the number of 
plant employees (these are expected direct linkage 
effects). 
 
Figure 3 details the effect of Minimum Efficient Scale 
(MEA) on market structure (the number of firms).  
 
 
Figure 3: Number of firms in relation to Minimum 
Efficient Scale, by PDO intensity 
 










When the MES is low (which indicates low barriers 
to entry), the number of firms increases slightly, but 
when the MES becomes higher, technological entry 
barriers increase, resulting in a lower equilibrium 
number of firms. However, the impact of the MES 
follows a different pattern for non PDO and PDO 
intensive sectors. While the MES has a strong negative 
impact for non PDO firms, it marginally affects PDO 
firms, suggesting that PDO firms are less hurt by 
market barriers. PDO regulation relaxes competition 
by compressing the production scale necessary to be 
profitable under this label.  
Table 3 provides estimates of the second set of 
equations, where we include now the number of 
farmers at the district level. Similar to the previous 
results, the regressors in the NFIRMS and NPLANTS 
equations are all significant with the expected signs. 
Also as expected, the greater number of plants in a 
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district and the higher share of milk collected from 
within the district increases the number of dairy 
farmers. Interestingly, the higher the share of PDO 
production in the district (S2_PDO)  reduces the 
number of farmers there, but not when crossed with 






Table 3: Three-stage Least Squares estimation results, 
determinants of district-level numbers of dairy farmers 
 
   NFIRMS NPLANTS  NFARMERS 
   coef coef coef 
MSIZE 0.395***     
MES -0.238***     
ADV -0.025***     
S1_PDO 3.086***     
NFIRMS   0.531***   
reg (dummies)    (omitted)   
NPLANTS     1.418*** 
S_MILK     0.609** 
S2_PDO     -0.905** 
MOUNT     -1.810*** 
UNDER     -1.613*** 
MOUNTxS2_PDO     1.652** 
UNDERxS2_PDO     -0.144 
_cons -1.855***    12.656*** 
R-sq  0.45 0.91 0.53 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Nb. Obs. 349 
V. CONCLUSION  
The empirical analysis has showed that the PDO label 
seems to positively contribute to the sustainability of 
rural employment, mainly through the downstream 
market channel. A higher share of PDO cheese 
products relaxes market competition, which enables 
more firms to operate on a larger market. In turn, the 
greater number of cheese processors implies more 
processing plants, typically implanted close to dairy 
farmers, which then translates into greater (or 
sustained) employment in these plants and higher 
numbers of dairy farmers.  
 
Yet the PDO label seems to have a negative direct 
economic influence on the number of farmers at the 
district level. Our econometric results show that the 
number of farmers decreases the higher the share of 
PDO at the district level. This seems to indicate that 
the PDO label is imposing constraints on farmers by 
adopting stringent production techniques, which 
ultimately impacts their cost of production. This 
negative effect is however overtaken by the 
downstream market effect, where demand for milk by 
plants affiliated with cheese processors is expanding 
due to the impact the PDO label is exerting on the 
overall market structure downstream.  
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